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Note from the Editor: I am always looking for contributions. If you have any suggestion con-
cerning the content of the Logic Column, or even better, if you would like to contribute by writing
a survey or tutorial on your own work or topic related to your area of interest, feel free to get in
touch with me.
At the last TACAS in Barcelona, already almost a year ago, Alur, Etessami, and Madhusudan
[2004] introduced CaRet, a temporal logic framework for reasoning about programs with nested
procedure calls and returns. The details of the logic were themselves interesting (I will return to
them later), but a thought struck me during the presentation, whether an axiomatization might
help understand the new temporal operators present in CaRet. Thinking a bit more about this
question quickly led to further questions about the notion of finiteness and infinity in temporal logic
as it is used in Computer Science. This examination of the properties of temporal logic operators
under finite and infinite interpretations is the topic that I would like to discuss here. I will relate
the discussion back to CaRet towards the end of the article, and derive a sound and complete
axiomatization for an important fragment of the logic.
Temporal logic is commonly used in Computer Science to reason about temporal properties
of state sequences [Pnueli 1977; Gabbay, Pnueli, Shelah, and Stavi 1980]. Generally, these state
sequences are the states that arise during the execution of a program. Temporal logic lets one write
down properties such as “an acquired lock is eventually released” or “it is never the case that the
value of such variable is zero”. These kinds of properties become even more important in concurrent
programs, where properties such as “every process eventually executes its critical section”, or “no
two processes ever execute their critical section simultaneously” are, shall I say, critical. Many
approaches have been developed for reasoning about programs using temporal logic. Most modern
methods are based on model checking (see [Clarke, Grumberg, and Peled 1999], for instance), while
other popular approaches are more proof-theoretic (see [Schneider 1997], for instance).
In the vast majority of cases, temporal logic is interpreted over infinite state sequences. Those
infinite sequences arise naturally, for example, when modeling reactive systems, which are systems
that maintain a permanent interaction with their environment, and hence are assumed to never
∗ c© Riccardo Pucella, 2005. This version differs slightly from that published in SIGACT News 36(1); it corrects
a number of typos in the semantics. Thanks to Claudia Zepeda for pointing them out.
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terminate [Manna and Pnueli 1992]. Even when modeling systems that may terminate, it is often
acceptable to assume that the final state of the system is simply infinitely repeated; this allows
infinite state sequences to be used. Intuitively, this approach works as long as nothing of interest
happens after the system has finished executing. What happens, however, when one wants to reason
about explicitly finite state sequences? For instance, one may want to reason about a sequence
of states embedded in a larger structure, where extending the sequence to an infinite sequence by
repeating the final state is not necessarily a reasonable step to take. This is exactly what happens
in CaRet, where some of the temporal operators are interpreted over the finite traces that make
up procedure invocations, all in the context of a complete program execution.1
In order to characterize the properties of the CaRet operators, we need to understand the
properties of temporal operators in the presence of finite sequences. Accordingly, my first goal is
to make clear the properties of temporal operators when interpreted over (1) finite state sequences,
(2) infinite state sequences, and (3) both finite and infinite state sequences. To do this, I present
a particularly simple axiomatization of temporal logic that is sound and complete over the class
of finite and infinite state sequences. As expected, a sound and complete axiomatization for the
logic interpreted over finite state sequences only can be derived by simply adding an axiom that
says “there are no infinite state sequences”, and a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic
interpreted over infinite state sequences only can be derived by simply adding an axiom that says
“all state sequences are infinite”. Interestingly, there is a uniform elementary proof that covers
all the cases. These results can be found in various forms in the literature, albeit often implicitly.
The presentation I give is meant to emphasize the contribution of exclusively finite and exclusively
infinite traces to the axiomatization of the temporal operators. The axiomatization will be used as
the basis of the sound and complete axiomatization for a fragment of CaRet.
Temporal Logic Over Infinite Sequences
Let me first discuss finiteness and infinity in the context of the simpler framework of propositional
linear temporal logic (LTL). The only temporal operators we consider are future time operators,
meaning that at a given state one can only reason about the current and future states, and not
past states. Furthermore, LTL embodies a linear notion of time: from any given state, there is a
single sequence of states describing the future.2
The language LTL is defined inductively by the following grammar, where p ranges over primitive
propositions taken from a set Φ0:
ϕ,ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | # ϕ | ϕU ψ.
Let ϕ ∨ ψ stand for ¬(¬ϕ∧ ¬ψ), and ϕ⇒ ψ stand for ¬ϕ∨ ψ. Further, let 3ϕ stand for true U ϕ,
and 2ϕ stand for ¬3¬ϕ. Finally, define #· ϕ as the dual of #, namely, ¬# ¬ϕ. The operator # is
sometimes called “weak next”; #ϕ reads “if there is a next state, then ϕ holds there”, The operator
1Another context where this occurs is in process logics [Pratt 1979], which lets one reason about finite segments
of program executions within a larger and potentially infinite execution. I hope to revisit this topic in an upcoming
column. Saake and Lipeck [1988] and Havelund and Ros¸u [2001] give additional motivation for considering temporal
reasoning over finite sequences. Other uses of temporal logic, for instance in descriptive complexity theory, often
assume an interpretation restricted to finite words [Straubing 1994].
2This is in contrast to logics interpreted over branching time, where a state can possibly have multiple futures,
and formulas can involve quantification over futures. See Emerson and Halpern [1986] for details on the relationship
between linear and branching time temporal logics.
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#· is sometimes called “strong next”; #· ϕ reads “there is a next state, and ϕ holds there”. The
formula ϕU ψ reads “ϕ holds until ψ is true”, while 3ϕ reads “ϕ will eventually be true” and 2ϕ
reads “ϕ is and always will be true”.
Temporal logic is interpreted over (linear) temporal structures. A temporal structure is a tuple
M = (S, σ, pi) where S is a set of states, σ is a finite or infinite sequence of states in S, and pi is
a valuation on the states, where pi(s) is the set of primitive propositions true at state s. Let |σ|
denote the length of σ, understood to be ∞ if σ is infinite. Infinity is assumed to behave in the
standard way with respect to integers, for instance, i <∞ for all integers i. A temporal structure
M = (S, σ, pi) is finite if σ is finite, and infinite otherwise. (Thus, finiteness of a structure depends
on the finiteness of the sequence, not that of the state space.) If σ = s0s1s2 . . . , I will sometimes
use the notation σi to refer to state si in σ.
Let M be the set of finite and infinite temporal structures. Let Minf be the class of infinite
structures, andMfin be the class of finite structures. Satisfiability of a formula can be defined in a
number of equivalent ways. If M = (S, σ, pi), where σ = s0s1 . . ., possibly finite, define (M, i) |= ϕ,
meaning that formula ϕ is true in structure M at position i ∈ {0, . . . , |σ|}, inductively as follows:
(M, i) |= p if p ∈ pi(si)
(M, i) |= ¬ϕ if (M, i) 6|= ϕ
(M, i) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M, i) |= ϕ and (M, i) |= ψ
(M, i) |= #ϕ if i = |σ| or (M, i+ 1) |= ϕ
(M, i) |= ϕU ψ if ∃j ∈ {i, . . . , |σ|} such that (M, j) |= ψ and ∀k ∈ {i, . . . , j − 1}, (M,k) |= ϕ.
Observe that #ϕ is defined in such a way that if the sequence is finite, #ϕ is true for all formulas
ϕ at the final state of the sequence. More drastically, #false is true at a state if and only if it is
the final state in the sequence. A formula ϕ is valid, written |= ϕ, if (M, i) |= ϕ for all structures
M and positions i.
The following axiomatization AX is well-known to be sound and complete for temporal logic,3
as interpreted over infinite structures [Gabbay, Pnueli, Shelah, and Stavi 1980; Fagin, Halpern,
Moses, and Vardi 1995; Halpern, Meyden, and Vardi 2004]:
Prop. All instances of propositional tautologies in LTL.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
T1. #ϕ ∧#(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ #ψ.
T2. ϕU ψ ⇔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧#(ϕU ψ)).
T3. #(¬ϕ)⇒ ¬# ϕ.
RT1. From ϕ infer #ϕ.
RT2. From ϕ′ ⇒ ¬ψ ∧#ϕ′ infer ϕ′ ⇒ ¬(ϕU ψ).
3Recall that an axiomatization is sound if every provable formula is valid, and complete if every valid formula is
provable.
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This axiomatization, by virtue of soundness and completeness, intrinsically characterizes infinite
structures. In fact, it is not hard to see that the axiomatization is not sound for finite structures.
More precisely, axioms T2 and T3 are not valid in finite structures. To see this, let p be a primitive
proposition, and consider the structure M1 = ({s}, s, pi), that is, a finite structure with a single
state s, a sequence consisting of that single state s, and where pi(s) = {p}. It is easy to verify that
(M, 0) 6|= false ∨ (p ∧#(pU false))⇒ pU false ,
which is an instance of T2, specifically, the ⇐ implication of T2, and
(M, 0) 6|= #false ⇒ ¬# true,
which is an instance of T3. Thus, in order to derive an axiomatization that is sound and complete
for a class structure including finite ones, axioms T2 and T3 must somehow be weakened.
A General Axiomatization
There is an axiomatization that is sound and complete for the class of finite and infinite structures.
Let AXgen be the following axiomatization, obtained from AX by replacing axioms T2 and T3 by
axioms T2’ and T3’:
Prop. All instances of propositional tautologies in LTL.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
T1. #ϕ ∧#(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ #ψ.
T2’. ϕU ψ ⇔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧#· (ϕU ψ)).
T3’. #ϕ⇔ (#false ∨#· ϕ).
RT1. From ϕ infer #ϕ.
RT2. From ϕ′ ⇒ ¬ψ ∧#ϕ′ infer ϕ′ ⇒ ¬(ϕU ψ).
Axiom T3’ captures the following intuition for #ϕ: either the next time step does not exist, or ϕ
is true there. As I have already argued, the fact that the next time step does not exist is expressed
by #false. The following variants of T1 are provable in AXgen : #· ϕ ∧ #(ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ #· ψ, and
#ϕ ∧#· (ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ #· ψ. This axiomatization is a simplification of the axiomatization of the future
fragment of the temporal logic of Lichtenstein, Pnueli, and Zuck [1985]. Roughly speaking, the
inference rule RT2 subsumes their axioms relating # and 2, using the fact that 2 is expressible
using U .
The following two axioms can be used to tailor the axiomatization to the case where the struc-
tures are infinite, and the case where the structures are finite. For infinite structures, an axiom is
needed to capture the fact that there is no final state:
Inf. ¬# false.
To obtain an axiomatization for finite structures, an axiom is needed to capture the fact that every
finite structure has a final state:
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Fin. 3 # false.
Let AXinf be the axiomatization AXgen augmented with axiom Inf, and let AXfin be the axioma-
tization AXgen augmented with axiom Fin. These axiomatizations completely characterize validity
in the appropriate class of structures. More precisely, the following result holds.
Theorem 1. For formulas in the language LTL,
(a) AXgen is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M,
(b) AXinf is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to Minf ,
(c) AXfin is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to Mfin .
The proof of this theorem is not difficult, and uses well-understood technology. The only
difficulty, in some sense, is coming up with the proposed axiomatization. To illustrate where all the
details are used, let me spell out the details of the proof. Soundness is straightforward to establish
in all cases. Completeness is established by proving the following equivalent statement. Recall that
a formula ϕ is ax -consistent, for an axiomatization ax , if ¬ϕ is not provable using the axioms and
inference rules of ax . Completeness is equivalent to the fact that consistency implies satisfiability.
Thus, it suffices to show that if ϕ is consistent with respect to one of the particular axiomatization,
then it is satisfiable in a structure in the corresponding class, that is, it is possible to construct an
appropriate structure such that ϕ is true in a state of the structure.
The construction is essentially independent of the axiomatization under consideration. Fix the
formula ϕ. The states of the model will be constructed from an extension of the set of subformulas
of ϕ. Let Cl ′(ϕ) be the smallest set S such that:
(a) ϕ ∈ S,
(b) true U # false ∈ S,
(c) if ¬ψ ∈ S then ψ ∈ S,
(d) if ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ S then ψ1 ∈ S and ψ2 ∈ S,
(e) if #ψ ∈ S then ψ ∈ S,
(f) if #¬ψ ∈ S then #ψ ∈ S,
(g) if ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ S then ψ1 ∈ S, ψ2S, and #· (ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ S.
Let Cl(ϕ) = Cl ′(ϕ) ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ Cl ′(ϕ)}. It is easy to check that for any ϕ, Cl(ϕ) is a finite set of
formulas. Note that #false and ¬# false are always in Cl(ϕ).
Let ax range over AXgen , AXinf , and AXfin . An ax -atom of ϕ is a maximally ax -consistent
subset of formulas in Cl(ϕ). It is easy to see that ax -atoms are finite. Let Atax (ϕ) be the set of
ax -atoms of ϕ; we use V,W, . . . to denote ax -atoms. Associate with every ax -atom V a formula V̂ ,
the conjunction of all the formulas in V , that is, V̂ =
∨
ψ∈V ψ. It is straightforward to check that
for every formula ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ) and every ax -atom V of ϕ, either ψ or ¬ψ is in V . (If not, then V is
not maximally ax -consistent.) Using axiom Prop, it is easy to show that any formula ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ)
is provably equivalent to the disjunction
∨
{V ∈Atax |ψ∈V } V̂ , and true is provably equivalent to the
disjunction
∨
V ∈Atax V̂ .
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For ax -atoms V and W , define V
ax
−→ W if V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ is ax -consistent. Let V
ax
−→ be the set
{W | V
ax
−→ W}. A chain of ax -atoms is a finite or infinite sequence V0, V1, . . . of ax -atoms with
the property that Vi
ax
−→ Vi+1, for all i. A chain V0, V1, . . . of ax -atoms is acceptable if for all i,
whenever ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Vi, then there exists j ≥ i such that ψ2 ∈ Vj and ψ1 ∈ Vi, . . . , Vj−1. The
following lemma isolates all the properties needed to prove the completeness results.
Lemma 2.
(a) For all #ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ) and ax-atoms V , #ψ ∈ V if and only if for all W ∈ V
ax
−→, ψ ∈W
(b) For all #· ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ) and ax-atoms V , #· ψ ∈ V if and only if there exists W ∈ V
ax
−→ such that
ψ ∈W .
(c) For all ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Cl(ϕ) and ax-atoms V0, ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0 if and only if there exists a finite
chain V0, V1, . . . , Vk such that ψ1 ∈ V0, . . . , Vk−1 and ψ2 ∈ Vk.
(d) For all ax-atoms V , #false ∈ V if and only if V
ax
−→ = ∅.
(e) For all AXfin -atoms V0, there exists a finite chain V0, . . . , Vk such that #false ∈ Vk.
(f) Every finite chain of AXgen-atoms is extensible to an acceptable chain (finite or infinite).
(g) Every finite chain of AXinf -atoms is extensible to an infinite acceptable chain.
(h) Every finite chain of AXfin -atoms is extensible to a finite acceptable chain.
Proof. The proof technique is adapted from that of Halpern, van der Meyden, and Vardi [2004].
(a) Assume that #ψ ∈ V , and let W ∈ V
ax
−→. By way of contradiction, assume that ψ 6∈ W .
Then, ¬ψ ∈ W , that is, ⊢ Ŵ ⇒ ¬ψ. By Prop and RT1, ⊢ #(ψ ⇒ ¬Ŵ ). By assumption, #ψ ∈ V ,
that is, ⊢ V̂ ⇒ #ψ. By MP and T1, ⊢ V̂ ⇒ #¬Ŵ . But V
ax
−→W means that V̂ ∧#· Ŵ is consistent,
so that 6⊢ V̂ ⇒ #¬Ŵ , a contradiction. So ψ ∈W .
Conversely, assume that for all W ∈ V
ax
−→, ψ ∈ W . By way of contradiction, assume that
#ψ 6∈ V , so that ¬# ψ ∈ V , and thus ⊢ V̂ ⇒ ¬# ψ. For any W such that ψ 6∈W , it must be the
case that W 6∈ V
ax
−→, and thus V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ is inconsistent. Thus, V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ is inconsistent for all W
such that ψ 6∈ W , and ∨{W |ψ 6∈W}(V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ ), is inconsistent, that is, V̂ ∧ #· ¬ψ is inconsistent, and
⊢ V̂ ⇒ ¬#· ¬ψ, or ⊢ V̂ ⇒ #ψ. By assumption, ⊢ V̂ ⇒ ¬# ψ, so that ⊢ V̂ ⇒ false , that is, ⊢ ¬V̂ ,
which contradicts the fact that V is a consistent set of formulas. Thus, #ψ ∈ V , as desired.
(b) Assume that #· ψ ∈ V . If #· ψ ∈ V , then #ψ ∈ V , and #ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ) by closure rule (4). Hence,
by part (a), all W ∈ V
ax
−→ are such that ψ ∈ W . It suffices to show then there is a W such that
V
ax
−→ W . Assume not. Then ∨{W |true∈W}(V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ ) is inconsistent, and hence ⊢ ¬(V̂ ∧ #· true),
and ⊢ V̂ ⇒ #false. Because #· ψ ∈ V , then ⊢ V̂ ⇒ ¬ # false. So ⊢ V̂ ⇒ false, that is, ⊢ ¬V̂ ,
contradicting V being consistent. So there must be a W ∈ V
ax
−→.
Conversely, assume that there exists W ∈ V
ax
−→ and ψ ∈W . Since V̂ ∧#· Ŵ is consistent, so is
∨{W |ψ∈W}(V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ ), and V̂ ∧ #· ψ. In other words, 6⊢ V̂ ∧ ¬#· ψ. Assume by way of contradiction
that #· ψ 6∈ V , so that ¬#· ψ ∈ V . Then ⊢ V̂ ⇒ ¬#· ψ, a contradiction. Therefore, #· ψ ∈ V .
(c) Assume that ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0. Suppose by way of contradiction that no suitable chain exists.
Let T be the smallest set S of ax -atoms of ϕ such that V0 ∈ S, and if W ∈ V
ax
−→ (for some V in
S) and Ŵ ∧ ψ1, then W ∈ S. If T is a set of ax -atoms, let T̂ =
∨
W∈T Ŵ . Clearly, ¬ψ2 ∈ W for
ACM SIGACT News 6 Vol. —, No. —
all W in T , and thus, ⊢ T̂ ⇒ ¬ψ2. Moreover, for every V in T and W ∈ V
ax
−→, either W ∈ T , or
¬ψ1 ∈ W and ¬ψ2 ∈ W . This yields ⊢ T̂ ⇒ #(T̂ ∨ (¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2)). It follows easily from T1, T2’,
RT1, RT2 that ⊢ T̂ ⇒ ¬(ψ1 U ψ2). In particular, ⊢ V̂0 ⇒ ¬(ψ1 U ψ2), contradicting ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0.
Conversely, by induction on k, if there exists V1 ∈ V0
ax
−→, . . . , Vk ∈ Vk−1
ax
−→, ψ1 ∈ Vi for
i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, and ψ2 ∈ Vk, then ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0. If k = 0, the result follows immediately by an
application of T2’ and T3’. For a general k, assume by way of contradiction that ψ1 U ψ2 6∈ V0 (so
that ¬ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0), and consider the subchain V1, . . . , Vk, such that V2 ∈ V1
ax
−→, . . . , Vk ∈ Vk−1
ax
−→,
ψ1 ∈ V1, . . . , Vk−1, and ψ2 ∈ Vk. By the induction hypothesis, ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V1, that is, ⊢ V̂1 ⇒ ψ1 U ψ2.
Since V1 ∈ V0
ax
−→, V̂0 ∧ #· V̂1 consistent, and by an application of RT1 and a #· -variant of T1,
V̂0∧#· ψ1 U ψ2 is consistent. Since ψ1 ∈ V0, ⊢ V̂0 ⇒ ψ1, and thus V̂0∧ψ1∧#· ψ1 U ψ2 is also consistent.
By T2’, V̂0 ∧ ψ1 U ψ2 is consistent, that is, 6⊢ V̂0 ⇒ ¬ψ1 U ψ2, contradicting the assumption that
¬ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0. Thus, ψ1 U ψ2 must be in V0, as desired.
(d) Assume that ⊢ V̂ ⇒ #false . By way of contradiction, assume there is a W ∈ V
ax
−→.
By Prop, ⊢ false ⇒ ¬Ŵ , and by RT1, ⊢ #(false ⇒ ¬Ŵ ). By propositional reasoning and T1,
⊢ V̂ ⇒ #¬Ŵ , which is equivalent to ⊢ V̂ ⇒ ¬#· Ŵ , that is, ⊢ ¬(V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ ), contradicting the
assumption that W ∈ V
ax
−→, that is, that V̂ ∧#· Ŵ is consistent.
Conversely, assume that there is no W ∈ V
ax
−→. Therefore, for all W , V̂ ∧#· Ŵ is inconsistent,
and thus, ∨W (V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ ) is inconsistent. By propositional reasoning, V̂ ∧ #· ∨W Ŵ , and thus
V̂ ∧#· true, is inconsistent. By propositional reasoning and definition of #· , this simply means that
⊢ V̂ ⇒ #false .
(e) Let V0 be an AX
fin -atom. Suppose by way of contradiction that no suitable chain exists.
Let T be the smallest set S of AXfin -atoms of ϕ such that V0 ∈ S, and if W ∈ V
AX
fin
−→ (for
some V in S) then W ∈ S. Clearly, ¬ # false ∈ W for all W in T (otherwise, it could be used
to construct a finite chain assumed not to exist), and thus, ⊢ T̂ ⇒ ¬ # false. Moreover, for
every V in T and W ∈ V
AX
fin
−→ , W ∈ T . Therefore, it is possible to derive ⊢ T̂ ⇒ #T̂ , which
implies that ⊢ T̂ ⇒ #(T̂ ∨ (¬true ∧ ¬ # false)). It follows easily from T1, T2’, RT1, RT2 that
⊢ T̂ ⇒ ¬(true U # false). In particular, ⊢ V̂0 ⇒ ¬(true U # false), contradicting true U # false ∈ V0,
by virtue of axiom Fin.
(f) Let V0, . . . , Vn be a finite chain of AX
gen-atoms. Consider a formula ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0. It
follows, from T2’ and parts (a) and (b), either that ψ2 ∈ Vj for some j ∈ {0, . . . , n} and ψ1 ∈ Vl
for l ∈ {0, . . . , j − 1}, or that ψ1 ∈ Vj for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Vn. In the latter case,
by part (c), there exists a chain Vn, . . . , Vn′ such that ψ1 ∈ Vk for k ∈ {n, . . . , n
′− 1} and ψ2 ∈ Vn′ .
This gives a finite extension of the original chain that satisfies the obligation of acceptability for
ψ1 U ψ2 at V0. Applying this argument to the remaining U -formulas in V0 produces a finite chain
that satisfies all the obligations at V0. Apply the same procedure to V1, and so on. In the limit,
this produces an acceptable chain extending the original chain. This chain can be either finite, or
infinite.
(g) Let V0, . . . , Vn be a finite chain of AX
inf -atoms. Just as in part (f), it is possible to
construct an acceptable chain extending this chain that satisfies all the obligations of the U -
formulas. If this process results in a finite acceptable chain V0, . . . , Vn′ , this chain can be extended
to an infinite acceptable chain as follows. Given the final state Vn′ of the chain, there exists a state
Vn′+1 ∈ Vn′
AX
inf
−→ . Otherwise, by part (d), ⊢
AX
inf V̂n′ ⇒ #false. However, by Inf, ⊢AXinf ¬# false ,
and thus by MP, ⊢
AX
inf ¬V̂n′ , contradicting the fact that Vn′ is AX
inf -consistent. Thus, there
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must exist Vn′+1 ∈ Vn′
AX
inf
−→ . Let V0, . . . , Vn′+1 be the new chain formed in this way. This chain
can be once again extended to an acceptable chain, by ensuring that all the obligations of the
U -formulas are satisfied. In the limit, this new procedure produces an infinite acceptable chain.
(h) Let V0, . . . , Vn be a finite chain of AX
fin -atoms, V0, . . . , Vk. By part (e), there exists a finite
chain Vk, . . . , Vn such that #false ∈ Vn. By part (d), this means that there Vn
AX
fin
−→ = ∅. It remains
to show that the chain is acceptable, that is, for every ψ1 U ψ2 in V0, . . . , Vn, the obligations are
met. Let ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Vi. Just as in part (f), it follows, from T2’ and parts (a) and (b), either that
ψ2 ∈ Vj for some i ≤ j ≤ n and ψ1 ∈ Vl for i ≤ l < j, or that ψ1 ∈ Vj for all i ≤ j ≤ n, and both
¬ψ2 ∈ Vn and ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Vn. In the former case, the obligations for ψ1 U ψ2 are met. The latter case
cannot arise. Indeed, if ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Vn, then ⊢ V̂n ⇒ ψ1 U ψ2, so that ⊢ V̂n ⇒ ψ2 ∨ (ψ1∧#· (ψ1 U ψ2)).
Since ¬ψ2 ∈ Vn, ⊢ V̂n ⇒ ¬ψ2, so that ⊢ V̂n ⇒ ψ1 ∧ #· (ψ1 U ψ2). Therefore, #· (ψ1 U ψ2) must be in
Vn. By part (b), there must exist W ∈ Vn
AX
fin
−→ with ψ1 U ψ2 ∈W , which contradicts that fact that
Vn
AX
fin
−→ = ∅. ⊓⊔
The completeness results of Theorem 1 follow easily from Lemma 2. Consider the axiomatization
AX
gen . Assume that ϕ is AXgen-consistent. Since ϕ ∈ Cl(ϕ), ϕ ∈ V ϕ for some AXgen-atom V ϕ
of ϕ. Construct the structure M = (S, σ, pi) by taking the set of states S to be the set AtAX
gen
(ϕ)
of AXgen-atoms of ϕ. Define the interpretation pi by pi(V ) = {p | p ∈ V }. All that remains now
is to extract a sequence σ in S that satisfies ϕ. By Lemma 2(f), V ϕ, a one-element finite chain of
AX
gen-atoms, is extensible to an acceptable chain σ = V0V1 . . . . It is easy to check, by induction
on the structure of ϕ, that (M, i) |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Vi. Since ϕ ∈ V
ϕ = V0, then (M, 0) |= ϕ. A
similar argument holds for AXinf and AXfin , invoking Lemma 2(g) and Lemma 2(h), respectively,
to construct an acceptable chain σ.
The Linear Temporal Logic of Calls and Returns
While the above discussion is still fresh, let me now talk about the CaRet logic. CaRet was
designed for reasoning about programs, in the form of state sequences, each sequence corresponding
to an execution of the program. It was especially designed for reasoning about nonregular properties
of programs. The classical example of such a property is the correctness of procedures with respect
to pre and post conditions, that is, verifying that if ϕ holds before every call to a procedure,
then ψ holds after the procedure returns. The nonregularity of this property is due to the fact
that finding the state where the procedure returns requires matching the number of calls and
returns within the body of the procedure. CaRet provides operators for doing just that. While
frameworks for verifying procedure with respect to pre and post conditions go back to the seminal
work of Hoare [1969], the main contribution of CaRet is a decidable model-checking procedure for
programs expressed as recursive state machines (equivalently, pushdown systems) [Alur, Etessami,
and Yannakakis 2001; Benedikt, Godefroid, and Reps 2001]. To achieve this, CaRet assumes that
every state is tagged, indicating whether it is a call state (meaning it is a state that performs a
procedure call), a return state (meaning it is a state that corresponds to having returned from a
procedure), or an internal state (everything else). I will not discuss the model-checking algorithm
here, but instead examine the properties of the new operators that CaRet introduces.
The language CaRet of linear propositional temporal logic with calls and returns is defined
inductively by the following grammar, where p ranges over primitive propositions taken from a set
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Φ0, which includes call ,ret , and int :
4
ϕ,ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | # ϕ | ϕU ψ | #
a ϕ | ϕU
aψ.
As before, define the usual abbreviations. Let ϕ ∨ ψ stand for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), and ϕ ⇒ ψ stand for
¬ϕ ∨ ψ. Define, as in LTL, 3ϕ to stand for true U ϕ, 2ϕ to stand for ¬3¬ϕ, and #· ϕ to stand for
¬# ¬ϕ. Define 3aϕ, 2aϕ, and #· aϕ in a similar way.
The # and U operators, the global-time operators, are the standard operators from LTL,
interpreted over whole sequences of states.5 Thus, #ϕ means that ϕ holds at the next state
whether or not the next state is a state in an invoked procedure, or the next state follows from
returning from a procedure. The #a and U a operators, the abstract-time operators, do not consider
all states in the sequence, but only the states in the current procedure context. Thus, #aϕ means
that ϕ holds at the abstract next state of the procedure—if the current state is a procedure call,
then the abstract next state is in fact the matching return state; if the current state is the last
state of a procedure invocation, there is no abstract next state; similarly, if the current state is a
procedure call that never returns (say, it enters an infinite loop), there is no abstract next state.
Correspondingly, ϕU aψ means that the abstract path from the current state (i.e., the path formed
by successive abstract successors) satisfies ϕU ψ.
To formalize these intuitions, CaRet is interpreted over structured (linear) temporal structures.
An structured temporal structure is a tuple M = (S, σ, pi) where S is a set of states, σ is an infinite
sequence of structured states in S × {call , ret , int}, and pi is a valuation on the states, where pi(s)
is the set of primitive propositions true at state s. For a sequence σ, define an abstract successor
function succaσ giving, for every index i into σ, the index of the next abstract state for σi. Formally,
the abstract successor is defined as follows. First, for a sequence of structured states σ, define the
partial map Rσ(i), which maps any i to the first unmatched return after i, that is, the first return
that does not correspond to a procedure call performed after i: Rσ(i) = j, where j is the smallest
j′ such that j′ > i, σj′ is a return state, and the number of calls and returns in σi+1, . . . , σj′−1
are equal; Rσ(i) = ⊥ if there is no such j
′. (Intuitively, ⊥ represents the value “undefined”.) The
abstract successor functions can now be defined:
succaσ(i) ,


Rσ(i) if σi = (−, call )
⊥ if σi 6= (−, call ) and σi+1 = (−, ret)
i+ 1 otherwise.
Let Mcr be the set of structured temporal structures. Satisfiability of a formula is defined as
follows. If M = (S, σ, pi), where σ = 〈(s0, t0), (s1, t1), . . .〉, define (M, i) |= ϕ, meaning that formula
ϕ is true in structure M at position i ≥ 0 inductively as follows:
(M, i) |= p if p ∈ pi(si) or p = ti
(M, i) |= ¬ϕ if (M, i) 6|= ϕ
(M, i) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M, i) |= ϕ and (M, i) |= ψ
4In fact, this is just a fragment of CaRet. The full logic includes past-time temporal operators that walk back
the call chain of a procedure. I believe that the development in this section extends in a straightforward way to the
full language, but I have not checked the details.
5Alur, Etessami, and Madhusudan use #gϕ and ϕU
gψ for the global-time operators.
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(M, i) |= #ϕ if (M, i+ 1) |= ϕ
(M, i) |= ϕU ψ if ∃j ≥ i such that (M, j) |= ψ and ∀k ∈ {i, . . . , j − 1}, (M,k) |= ϕ
(M, i) |= #aϕ if succaσ(i) = ⊥ or (M, succ
a
σ(i)) |= ϕ
(M, i) |= ϕU aψ if ∃i0, i1, . . . , ik (with i0 = i) such that succ
a
σ(ij) = ij+1 6= ⊥ (for j =
0, . . . , k − 1), (M, ik) |= ψ, and (M, ij) |= ϕ (for j = 0, . . . , k − 1).
(The semantics above uses a “weak” semantics for #aϕ, while the original description of CaRet
uses a “strong” semantics. In other words, the interpretation of #aϕ in the original CaRet is the
same as that of #· aϕ here. I made this choice for consistency with the usual reading of # as a weak
next and to reuse the development of last section. Clearly, there is no loss of expressiveness from
this change.)
What about an axiomatization for this logic? The following axioms account for the fact that
the #/U fragment of CaRet is essentially LTL interpreted over infinite sequences.
Prop. All instances of propositional tautologies in CaRet.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
G1. #ϕ ∧#(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ #ψ.
G2. ϕU ψ ⇔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧#· (ϕU ψ)).
G3. #ϕ⇔ (#false ∨#· ϕ).
G4. ¬# false.
RG1. From ϕ infer #ϕ.
RG2. From ϕ′ ⇒ ¬ψ ∧#ϕ′ infer ϕ′ ⇒ ¬(ϕU ψ).
The operators #a and U a behave like the standard temporal operators, except they are inter-
preted over possibly finite sequences.
A1. #aϕ ∧#a(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ #aψ.
A2. ϕU aψ ⇔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧#· a(ϕU aψ)).
A3. #aϕ⇔ (#afalse ∨#· aϕ).
RA1. From ϕ infer #aϕ.
RA2. From ϕ′ ⇒ ¬ψ ∧#aϕ′ infer ϕ′ ⇒ ¬(ϕU aψ).
The remaining axioms capture the relationship between the kind of states (call states, return
states, internal states), and the behavior of the various next-time operators. Roughly, this amounts
to capturing the properties of the succaσ function, when it is defined, and when it is not. The
following axiom says that there is exactly one of call , ret , int that holds at any state.
C1. (call ∧ ¬ret ∧ ¬int) ∨ (¬call ∧ ret ∧ ¬int) ∨ (¬call ∧ ¬ret ∧ int).
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If the current state is not a call state, then the properties of the abstract next state operator depend
on whether the next global state is a return state.
C2. ¬call ∧#(¬ret)⇒ (#ϕ⇔ #· aϕ).
C3. ¬call ∧#(ret)⇒ #afalse .
C4. #· aϕ⇒ 3ϕ.
Already, it is possible to derive from these axioms that if a state is not a call state and there is
no abstract next state, then the global next state must be a return state; in other words, the only
case where there is no abstract next state (unless a procedure call is performed) is at the end of a
procedure invocation. Here is a formal derivation of ¬call ∧#afalse ⇒ #ret :
1. ⊢ ¬call ∧#¬ret ⇒ (#true ⇔ ¬#a false) (C2)
2. ⊢ ¬call ⇒ (#¬ret ⇒ (#true ⇒ ¬#a false)) (1,Taut,MP)
3. ⊢ (#¬ret ⇒ (#true ⇒ ¬#a false))⇒ (#true ⇒ (#afalse ⇒ ¬# ¬ret)) (Taut)
4. ⊢ ¬call ⇒ (#true ⇒ (#afalse ⇒ ¬# ¬ret)) (2, 3,MP)
5. ⊢ #true ⇒ (¬call ⇒ (#afalse ⇒ ¬# ¬ret)) (4,Taut,MP)
6. ⊢ #true (Taut,RG1)
7. ⊢ ¬call ⇒ (#afalse ⇒ ¬# ¬ret) (5, 6,MP)
8. ⊢ ¬call ∧#afalse ⇒ ¬# ¬ret (7,Taut,MP)
9. ⊢ #ret ⇔ (#false ∨ ¬# ¬ret) (G3)
10. ⊢ (#ret ⇔ (#false ∨ ¬# ¬ret))⇒ (¬ # false ⇒ (¬# ¬ret ⇒ #ret)) (Taut)
11. ⊢ ¬# false ⇒ (¬# ¬ret ⇒ #ret) (10,MP)
12. ⊢ ¬# false (G4)
13. ⊢ ¬# ¬ret ⇒ #ret (11, 12,MP)
14. ⊢ ¬call ∧#afalse ⇒ #ret (8, 13,MP).
If the current position is a call, then the abstract successor exists or not, depending on whether
or not there is a balanced number of calls and returns before the return matching the call. This
turns out to be painful to capture. Intuitively, the logic cannot count—there is no way to say
(directly) that “there are exactly the same number of call states as there are return states before
the matching return”. The best one can do is basically enumerate all possibilities. Define the class
of formulas CRcm,n(ϕ), one for every c,m, n ≥ 0 such that c +m ≥ n. Intuitively, CR
c
m,n(ϕ) says
that between the current state and the first state where ϕ holds, there are exactly m call states
and n return states, and moreover there are never more then c return states more than the number
of call states.
CRcm,n(ϕ) ,


int U ϕ if m = 0, n = 0
int U (call ∧#CR
c+1
m−1,n if m > 0, n = 0
int U (ret ∧#CR
c−1
m,n−1 if m = 0, n > 0
int U (call ∧#CR
c+1
m−1,n if m > 0, n > 0, c = 0
int U (call ∧#CR
c+1
m−1,n(ϕ))
∨int U (ret ∧#CR
c−1
m,n−1(ϕ))
if m > 0, n > 0, c > 0.
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With this, it is possible to define a countable number of axioms that essentially say that if the
current state is a call state, and the number of calls and returns following the current state match
before there is a return where ϕ holds, then there is an abstract next state and ϕ holds there.
C5. call ∧#CR0n,n(ret ∧ ϕ)⇒ #·
aϕ (for n ≥ 0).
Of course, C5 is a family of axioms, one for each n ≥ 0.
Similarly, if the number of calls exceeds the number of returns after a call state, then there
cannot be an abstract next state.
C6. call ∧#CR0m,n(2¬ret)⇒ #
afalse (for m > n ≥ 0).
Again, C6 is a family of axioms, one for each m > n ≥ 0.
Theorem 3. AXcr is a sound and complete axiomatization for CaRet with respect to structured
temporal structures.
Soundness is straightforward. The strategy for proving completeness is, unsurprisingly, analo-
gous to that of the proof of Theorem 3: assuming ϕ is consistent, completeness requires showing
that ϕ is satisfiable; to construct a model of ϕ, take an atom of ϕ containing ϕ, and extend it to
an acceptable infinite sequence of atoms. I leave it to the reader to generalize Cl ′(ϕ) and Cl(ϕ) in
the right way, by adding clauses for #a and U a mimicking those for # and U . Atoms of ϕ have
the same definition, maximally consistent subsets of formulas in Cl(ϕ), as does the formula V̂ for
any given atom V . (For atoms, as for the other notions, there is no need for an axiomatization
qualification, as there is a single axiomatization to consider.) The relation V −→W between atom
is again defined to hold if V̂ ∧ #· Ŵ is consistent. A chain of atoms is a finite or infinite sequence
V0, V1, . . . of atoms with the property that Vi −→ Vi+1, for all i. It remains to show how to extend
a finite chain of atoms into a suitably defined acceptable chain. This is where things vary from the
proof of Theorem 1, to account for the structured states.
First, given a (possibly finite) chain V = V0, V1, V2, . . . , define RV and succ
a
V
just as they are
defined for sequences of states, but instead of checking that an element at index i is a call state
(resp., a return state or an internal state) by checking that it is of the form (−, call) (resp., (−, ret)
or (−, int)), do so by checking that call ∈ Vi (resp., ret ∈ Vi or int ∈ Vi). This is well defined,
thanks to axiom C1.
An infinite chain V = V0, V1, . . . of atoms is acceptable if for all i,
• whenever ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Vi, then there exists i ≤ j ≤ |σ| such that ψ2 ∈ Vj and ψ1 ∈ Vi, . . . , Vj−1;
• whenever #aψ ∈ Vi, then ψ ∈ Vsucca
V
(i);
• whenever ψ1 U
aψ2 ∈ Vi, then there exists i0, i1, . . . , ik (with i0 = i) such that succ
a
V
(ij) =
ij+1 6= ⊥ (for j = 0, . . . , k − 1), ψ2 ∈ Vik , and ψ1 ∈ Vij (for j = 0, . . . , k − 1).
The following lemma isolates the properties needed to finish the proof of completeness.
Lemma 4.
(a) For all #ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ) and atoms V , #ψ ∈ V if and only if for all W ∈ V−→, ψ ∈W
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(b) For all #· ψ ∈ Cl(ϕ) and atoms V , #· ψ ∈ V if and only if there exists W ∈ V−→ such that
ψ ∈W .
(c) For all ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Cl(ϕ) and atoms V0, ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0 if and only if there exists a finite chain
V0, V1, . . . , Vk such that ψ1 ∈ V0, . . . , Vk−1 and ψ2 ∈ Vk.
(d) For all #aψ ∈ Cl(ϕ) and atoms V0, #
aψ ∈ V0 if and only if for all finite chains V of atoms
V0, V1, . . . , Vk such that succ
a
V
(0) = k, ϕ ∈ Vk.
(e) For all ψ1 U
aψ2 ∈ Cl(ϕ) and atoms V0, ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ V0 if and only if there exists a finite
chain V of atoms V0, V1, . . . , Vk and indices i0, . . . , ij < k such that succ
a
V
(il) = il+1 (for
l = 0, . . . , j − 1), succa
V
(ij) = k, ψ1 ∈ Vi0 , . . . , Vij and ψ2 ∈ Vk.
(f) Every finite chain of atoms is extensible to an acceptable chain.
I leave the proof as an exercise; it follows the structure of the proof of Lemma 2 quite closely,
despite requiring a slightly more involved argument for parts (d) and (e), as one would expect.
So there we are: a sound and complete axiomatization for (an important fragment of) CaRet.
We get the usual benefits from it, namely, the possibility of reasoning purely deductively about
structured temporal structures, and this gives an alternative to model-checking for proving prop-
erties of programs. I do not know, at this point, whether the decision problem for the logic is
decidable, and so reasoning deductively may not be feasible. One problem with the axiomatization
AX
cr is that it is not very nice. In fact, axioms C5 and C6 are downright ugly. I believe this
is difficult to avoid. Since CaRet does not have operators for counting, the axioms must keep
count the hard way—listing all possibilities—to match returns to calls. It may still be possible,
however, to develop alternate axiomatizations more suited to using CaRet as a program logic.
That remains to be seen.
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